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Chapter 1: Introduction
Those who study political science frequently find that the discipline does not exist 
in a vacuum.  Other areas of study, including history, geography, and even demography 
play important roles in understanding the world of politics.  However, the discipline that 
is arguably the most intertwined with political science is economics.  In democratic 
states, the fate of elected officials is inexorably tied to the strength of their state’s 
economy.  With the advent of the welfare state, politicians are expected to be economic 
gurus as well as strong leaders and expert negotiators.  While the Economist King may 
have replaced Plato’s Philosopher King as the ideal head of government, in reality 
economists and politicians often disagree on the proper course of action for a state.  
Oftentimes, the vast majority of economists may agree on a particular policy as being 
optimal, but the policy may be politically untenable due to massive unpopularity.  This is 
often the case with free trade, which is generally considered by economists to be 
beneficial to all states involved but because of the high costs it entails for some workers 
is also generally unpopular.
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are a popular and controversial instrument in 
the promotion of free trade.  Economically, states often have much to gain from lowering 
or removing trade barriers to their geographical neighbors.  There are several economic 
benefits to free trade.  Lower trade barriers mean larger markets for producers of goods 
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and services.  This increased market access allows firms to expand and often enjoy 
economies of scale.  An economic principle known as comparative advantage describes 
how states can increase their income by focusing production where they are most 
efficient and importing those goods that are produced relatively more efficiently 
elsewhere.  In this way, citizens of all states that are members of a regional trade 
agreement benefit from cheaper goods and, increasingly, services.  When politicians or 
economists say they believe in free trade, these economic impacts are frequently cited as 
benefits of trade liberalization.
While the economic benefits of free trade may be the most obvious, they are far 
from the only reasons why states enter into regional trade agreements.  There are a 
number of reasons why states may choose to form an RTA that have little or nothing to 
do with economics.  Regional security concerns, domestic politics or a desire for 
international prestige are a few examples.  When a state chooses to initiate a regional 
trade agreement or join an existing one, it is likely that a variety of factors are involved.  
Some of these factors will have more to do with economics while others will be more 
political.  Depending on the unique circumstances of the state and the RTA, these factors 
will have differing degrees of importance.
Further, each state in an RTA is likely to have a somewhat different set of 
motives.  In some cases, these motives may differ radically from one state to the next.  It 
is also important to consider that states are not unitary actors.  The view of the 
government may be different than the view of the opposition, which in turn may differ 
from the view of the majority of the people.  In some cases, a small but vocal minority 
can substantially affect a state’s trade policy.  We will see how the passage of the Single 
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European Act in Ireland was delayed by the actions of one private citizen.  The 
motivations of politicians and concerned citizens in establishing a state’s policy with 
respect to free trade agreements will be the central topic of this thesis.
This thesis will argue that economics are often not the primary motivation for 
states joining RTAs, or further integrating an existing one.  To support this idea, I will 
examine two cases.  The first, the European Community (EC), is perhaps the most 
important case of an RTA.  It is unique in the degree to which its members have 
integrated, most recently by establishing a common currency.  The EC is also an example 
of an RTA that was formed for a variety of reasons, some of which were largely 
economic but many of which dealt with regional security.  The European Community is 
today unique in the world in the degree to which it has promoted trade amongst members 
and forged political ties.  However, the high degree of integration in Europe is relatively 
recent, despite the fact that today’s European Union was established as the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.  Therefore this thesis 
will examine the motivations of the EC member states for agreeing to and implementing 
the watershed Single European Act (SEA).  The SEA, which took effect in 1987, 
implemented reforms necessary to the creation of the European common market.
The second case study will be the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  NAFTA, which was negotiated in the early 1990’s and came into effect in 
1994, is obviously very different from the European Community.  It has fewer members, 
was formed much later and has not yet approached the degree of integration that can be
seen in Europe.  However, it is still highly integrated relative to many other RTAs.  Since 
it has only three members it will be more manageable to examine the motives of each 
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member.  The disparity between the states, both in strength of economy and influence in 
the region, can provide insight into the motivations of the different types of states who 
choose to participate in regional trade agreements.
Background
The second chapter will be a general discussion of regional trade agreements.  It 
will include a working definition of regional trade agreements as well as an explanation 
of the distinction between the three major types of regional trade agreements: free trade 
areas, customs unions, and common markets.  The chapter will also explain briefly the 
economic principles involved in regional trade agreements, including the aforementioned 
principle of comparative advantage.  Although the central point of this thesis is that 
economic motives are not the only reason states choose to join RTAs, it is important to 
introduce them so as to be able to identify them and where they fit in a particular state’s 
set of motivating factors.  Some other general issues having to do with regional trade 
agreements will be dealt with here, including the way in which RTAs can be either trade-
creating or trade-diverting.
This chapter will also look briefly at the history of free trade agreements and 
identify some major regional trade agreements not being discussed in a case study, 
including Mercosur, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  Finally it will 
touch briefly on the role of regional trade agreements in the global trading system today, 
including their growing popularity and their role in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Though this information will not directly provide answers to the question at 
hand, it is nevertheless important background information for any discussion of regional 
trade agreements.
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Origins of Regional Trade Agreements
The third chapter will identify and explore the various reasons, both economic 
and non-economic, that states enter into RTAs.  Some of these reasons will certainly be 
more obvious than others.  The economic benefits of free trade are almost always a 
motivating factor in the formation of regional trade agreements, but other motivating 
factors may be particular to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of a certain 
RTA and the unique characteristics of the states involved.  In many cases different states 
entering into the same RTA will have very different and perhaps even contrary motives.  
In almost all cases, a variety of motives will be present.
Certain motives can be broadly regarded as economic while others can be 
considered political.  However, in some cases this distinction may not be as clear.  For 
example, a group of states are displeased with the direction of WTO negotiations and 
threaten to form an RTA that will divert trade from other WTO members unless their 
demands are met.  This has both economic and political repercussions.  It is unlikely that 
there will be anything like a purely economic or purely non-economic regional trade 
agreement.  However, the different causes are to be found in different degrees in each 
individual RTA, and some can be considered to be more economic while others more 
political or security-based. The central task of the third chapter will thus be to survey the 
theoretical literature and identify the motives that states have for joining RTAs and 
distinguish between those that are more economic in nature and those that deal largely 
with political or foreign policy matters.
Case study #1: The European Community
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The European Union today is without a doubt far more than a regional trade 
agreement.  It is by now a supranational organization that in some ways resembles a 
sovereign state.  However, the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community 
established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to today’s common market was a lengthy 
process, with many false starts and dead ends.  In fact, it has been only recently that many 
of the most significant integration measures have been implemented.
This thesis will focus on the European Community during the negotiations of the 
Single European Act (SEA).  It will examine the motives each member state had for 
pooling their sovereignty by surrendering the ability to veto proposals they disagree with, 
a central reform of the SEA.  It may seem more logical to compare the EC and NAFTA 
from their origins onward.  However, comparing the two RTAs at the same point in time 
rather than at the same point in their respective developments controls for the 
international climate at the time of the negotiations.  The time periods discussed in the 
two case studies will be roughly the same.
Case study #2: NAFTA
This chapter will discuss the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
It will first address the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) that was 
the precursor to NAFTA.  It will examine the NAFTA negotiations and determine the 
motives of each party involved.  Since NAFTA and the European Community were 
formed nearly forty years apart, there were two possible methods for comparing the 
RTAs.  The first would be to compare them at the same points in their respective 
developments, i.e. the first five years of NAFTA and the first five years of the ECSC.  
However, I have chosen to instead compare the two at approximately the same time (late 
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1980’s, early 1990’s).  I believe this method is preferable because the international 
climate in the wake of the Second World War when the Treaty of Rome was signed is 
quite different than the post -Cold War climate of the NAFTA negotiations.
Findings and Conclusion
This chapter will discuss the major economic and non-economic motives for 
states that choose to join regional trade agreements.  It will attempt to draw comparisons 
between the two case studies and thereby identify patterns in the reasoning of RTA 
members.  It will also seek to discern the variation in motives of different members of the 
same RTA, for example the motivations of large versus small states or rich versus poor 
states.  This chapter will draw heavily on the information provided in the case studies as 
evidence to support some of the theoretical arguments put forth in Chapter 3.
The thesis will end with a discussion of the future of regional trade agreements 
and the impact they will have on the way states interact.  The European Union is a new 
and exciting political experiment and, like the United States before it, may result in other 
states or groups of states to follow its lead.  Conversely, the European Union may stand 
alone as an historical anomaly as the world moves along a path of globalization that does 
not ultimately interfere with state sovereignty.  Examining the motives of EU member 
states and identifying the reasons behind each state’s membership can give us a better 
picture of the likelihood of future regional groupings such as the European Union coming 
into being.
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Chapter 2: A Brief Primer on Regional Trade Agreements
A regional trade agreement, sometimes called a preferential trading agreement, is 
formed when a group of states in the same geographical region agree to give each other 
special treatment with respect to tariff policy.1  A tariff is a tax that a state levies on an 
imported good.  Thus tariffs discourage trade by increasing the price of the imported 
good in the domestic market.  Because trade brings many economic advantages, which 
will be discussed further below, states often feel they have an incentive to promote free 
trade.  This incentive is particularly strong among states in close geographical proximity, 
which are natural trading partners.  This is because transport costs are a major factor in 
trade, and these costs tend to be lower for neighboring states.  Thus two or more states in 
a region may agree to reduce their tariffs on goods traded amongst them to a rate lower 
than that at which goods from outside states are taxed.
There are three major types of regional trade agreements: free trade areas, 
customs unions, and common markets.  The first two differ in the way in which tariffs are 
levied on goods that are imported from states outside the agreement.  In a free trade area, 
a common tariff rate is set for goods traded within the area but each state sets its own 
external tariff rate.  The problem with this arrangement is that the states share a de facto 
common external tariff rate.  All states not party to the agreement will simply export their 
goods to the member state with the lowest external tariffs, since their goods can then in 
principle be freely re-exported to the other members.  This can spur a race to the bottom 
1
 Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison 
Wesley, 2003), 243.
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by which all the members attempt to have the lowest external tariff rate and thus enjoy 
the highest proportion of the tariff revenue.
To solve this problem, states may establish a customs union.  This is a form of
regional trade agreement in which all member states have a common tariff rate for goods 
imported from non-member states.  Although the customs union does solve the problem 
of disparity in external tariff rates, it can be difficult for the member states to agree on a 
common tariff rate. Unsurprisingly, states are often reluctant to give up the power to set 
their own tariff rates.  Thus while customs unions make more sense from an economic 
standpoint, free trade areas are often more feasible politically.2
The third type of RTA, the common market, is an even more deeply integrated 
region in which goods, services, investment, and people flow freely across the internal 
borders of the member states.  Tariffs are a common and overt method of protecting an 
economy, but there are many other methods that are more complicated and subtle.  These 
measures, collectively known as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), often come in the form of 
product quality control standards.  Some of these measures are perfectly legitimate.  For 
example, no one would question a state’s right to protect its citizens by ensuring that food 
sold domestically is safe for consumption.  However, many regulations are not based on 
reasonable safety concerns.
A famous example of a non-tariff barrier is the case of Cassis de Dijon.  Cassis de 
Dijon was a liqueur produced in France and exported to the other member states of the 
European Community in the 1970’s.  However, Cassis de Dijon was banned from sale in 
Germany due to a German regulation that all fruit liqueurs must have a minimum alcohol 
content of 25%.  Cassis de Dijon did not meet this requirement.  While the requirement 
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may have some cultural significance, it was certainly not a public health issue.  The 
European Court of Justice, the European Community’s judiciary body, ruled that 
Germany must allow the liqueur to be sold.
Regardless of which type of RTA is being employed, certain economic benefits 
are present.  One important economic benefit is economies of scale.  In certain industries, 
a large initial expense is present at the outset, but the marginal cost, or the cost to supply 
the product or service to one more consumer, is low.  For example, imagine a major 
metropolitan newspaper with a large number of overseas bureaus employing many 
reporters.  The cost of maintaining this network of international correspondents would be 
high.  However, the cost remains the same regardless of how many newspapers are sold.  
Once these offices are established, the only costs of selling one additional newspaper are 
the costs of printing and distributing it.  Thus as the newspaper gains more subscribers, 
the cost of overseas offices is divided up among more consumers, and the average cost of 
each newspaper to the newspaper company goes down.  At the same time, the price of 
each newspaper remains the same, so the newspaper company makes slightly more profit 
on each additional newspaper sold than it did on the last.
This concept, known as increasing returns to scale (IRS), demonstrates how firms 
can gain from free trade.  The firm that enjoys increasing returns to scale strongly prefers 
to have as many customers as possible.  Free trade facilitates this by opening access to 
new markets.  These firms would be especially supportive of regional trade agreements 
because of the generally low transport costs associated with exporting their product.
The principle of comparative advantage describes another major way in which 
states enjoy the economic benefit of free trade.  In a situation in which two states each 
2
 Ibid., 244.
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have absolute advantages in the efficiency of production of two different goods, the 
benefits of free trade can be seen clearly.  Assume the United States produces bicycles 
more cheaply than Canada, and Canada produces computers more cheaply than the 
United States.  In this situation, Canada should produce only computers and the United 
States should produce only bicycles.  Then the United States can trade some if its cheaper 
bicycles for some of Canada’s cheaper computers and both states will have more of both 
goods.
The above scenario, in which one or both parties gain without any party losing, is 
known in economics as a Pareto improvement.  This is a true “win-win situation.”  A 
situation in which there can be no Pareto improvement is referred to as Pareto optimal.  
In other words, no party can have more goods without taking them away from another 
party.  In any non-Pareto optimal situation, economic logic dictates that the Pareto 
improvement be made.  Thus in the above example the United States and Canada should 
trade with each other.  Choosing not to trade with each other would not be Pareto optimal 
because they could each specialize in the production of the good they produce more 
efficiently and both be better off by trading.
What is less intuitive is that even if Canada can make both bicycles and 
computers more efficiently than the United States, both states can still benefit from 
specialization and trade.  The United States simply needs to specialize in the good in 
which it has a comparative advantage in production.  An example with numbers, 
borrowed from The Economist, is helpful in illustrating this point.3  Let’s say that both 
Canada and the United States have 1000 workers.  These workers can be freely 
transferred from the production of bicycles to the production of computers, although the 
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workers have different levels of productivity.  The United States needs four workers to 
make a bicycle, while Canada needs two.  On the other hand, the United States requires 
100 workers to make a computer whereas Canada needs only ten.
By dividing the number of laborers per computer by the number of laborers per 
bicycle, we can see that in a sense it “costs” Canada five bicycles to make a computer, 
while it costs the United States twenty-five.  This is because in order for Canada to make 
one computer it would have to use as many workers as it could have used to make five 
bicycles.  This idea of foregone production is known in economics as the “opportunity 
cost.”  The American opportunity cost for a bicycle in terms of computers (.1) is thus 
lower than Canada’s (.2).  By specializing in making bicycles and trading those bicycles 
to Canada for computers, the United States and Canada achieve a Pareto improvement 
because Canada has access to bicycles at the cheaper American cost while the United 
States benefits from cheaper Canadian computers.  Even though Canada makes both 
computers and bicycles more efficiently than the United States, it can still benefit from 
trading with the United States.
Comparative advantage shows how states can achieve a Pareto improvement by 
trading.  However, even though trade is a win-win situation for trading states, it is not a 
win-win situation for all citizens in those trading states.  When the United States 
specializes in the production of bicycles, workers in the American computer industry will 
be laid off.  Workers in the Canadian bicycle industry also face unemployment.  In 
general, industrialized states have a comparative advantage in capital and knowledge-
intensive industries such as technology.  Less developed states tend to have a 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, textiles and agriculture in which they can 
3
 “Trade Winds,” The Economist, 6 November 1997.
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benefit from lower labor costs.  Trade liberalization therefore often results in 
manufacturing and agricultural job losses in industrialized states, and thus can be 
opposed by powerful lobbies.
Comparative advantage also indicates which industries in a particular economy 
are likely to be protected.  Industries that are competitive internationally (the Canadian 
computer industry or American bicycle industry in the example) do not need to be 
protected, whereas those that are likely to contract after trade is liberalized (the Canadian 
bicycle industry and American computer industry) will often be protected.  In practice, it 
is generally the labor-intensive industries that are protected in industrialized states, since 
developing countries often have cheaper labor and are thus competitive in these 
industries.
Aside from the unpleasant consequences for workers in some industries, regional 
trade agreements would appear to be an excellent way for states to enjoy the benefits of 
free trade.  However, RTAs are controversial even among those who support free trade 
because they are often thought to be trade-diverting rather than trade-creating.  A 
dichotomy is seen between regionalism and multilateralism.  Today, the main forum for 
multilateral trade liberalization is the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the WTO, was established in 
1948.  The WTO as it exists today came into being on January 1, 1995 and currently has 
146 members.
One of the major principles of the GATT/WTO system is most-favored nation 
(MFN) status.  This means that a WTO member cannot discriminate against other WTO 
members in its tariff rates.  In theory, a WTO member state must impose the same tariff 
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rates on goods imported from all other member states, and this rate must be the same as 
or lower than the rates imposed on goods imported from non-member states.  This 
principle would prevent WTO members from forming RTAs that necessitate offering a 
lower tariff rate to other RTA-members than to non-RTA members who are members of 
the WTO.  Instead, the WTO makes MFN exceptions for RTAs.  However, some believe 
that this exception is bad for global free trade, since some RTAs are thought to 
discourage trade on the multilateral level.
The economic theory behind this issue is explained by Paul Krugman and 
Maurice Obstfeld in their book International Economics: Theory and Policy.  In theory, a 
state gains from joining an RTA if removing tariffs causes a good that was previously 
produced domestically to be imported from another RTA member.  This scenario, 
referred to as trade creation, occurs when the good is produced more cheaply by the other 
RTA member, and results in goods being bought at a cheaper price.  On the other hand, if 
a good is already being imported and joining an RTA causes it to be imported from a 
member rather than a non-member, the importing state loses.  This is called trade 
diversion.  It occurs when the lowest cost producer of a good is not a member of the 
RTA, but tariffs prevent its goods from being sold at a lower price than those of an RTA 
member, whose goods are produced at a higher cost but sold tariff free.  Although 
consumers in the importing state can buy the good for a lower price, their savings are 
outweighed by the government’s loss of tariff revenue.4
Despite their economic ambiguity, RTAs remain popular among policy makers.  
Many of these are simply bilateral agreements, or trade agreements between two states.  
The few examples of multi-state RTAs are for one reason or another not as deeply 
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integrated as the EC or NAFTA.  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an 
example of an RTA that is not yet highly integrated.  Its twenty-one members include 
states from North and South America and Asia, as well as Australia.  Formed in 1989 as 
an “informal Ministerial-level dialogue group,” APEC set goals for free trade and 
investment between developed members by 2010 and less developed members by 2020.5
However, APEC today has become an organization more focused on security than 
economics.6  Mercosur, South America’s attempt at a common market, was established in 
1991 by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Unfortunately, trade liberalization 
efforts in Latin America were stymied by severe recessions in Brazil and Argentina in the 
late 1990’s.7
The popularity of regional trade agreements has not abated, as evidenced by 
President Bush’s current attempts to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
and the recently concluded Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  This 
continued popularity seems puzzling because RTAs often bear high political costs due to 
the unemployment they can create.  As noted above, even economists do not 
unanimously support them, as they are thought to sometimes be trade-diverting.  
However, states still attempt to establish RTAs, with varying degrees of success.  States’ 
reasoning for joining RTAs will be examined in a theoretical sense in the next chapter.  
4
 Krugman and Obstfeld, 245-256.
5
 “Key APEC Milestones,” http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec/history.html, (6 April 2004).
6
 “Not So Pacific,” The Economist, 23 October 2003.
7
 “Mercosur,” Economist.com Backgrounders, 30 March 2001, 
http://economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaybackgrounder.cfm?bg=547841, (6 April 2004).
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The following two chapters will look at two of the most successful RTAs, the EC and 
NAFTA, to assess whether or not the empirical evidence supports the theory.
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Chapter 3: Non-economic Motivations for Joining Regional Trade Agreements
From an economic standpoint, efficiency gains through exploitation of 
comparative advantage are the major benefit of free trade.  However, some of the reasons 
a state chooses to join an RTA may have nothing to do with economics.  Although much 
of the literature dealing with RTAs focuses on the economic costs and benefits, some 
significant scholarly work has been done in the area of non-economic motivations for 
joining RTAs.  This chapter will survey this literature and highlight some of the major 
theoretical motivations of states that choose to join or establish regional trade 
agreements.
In democratic states, policy decisions are made by elected officials.  Although 
most are not so cynical, one could argue that the major motivation for all policy decisions 
is to get the elected officials making them re-elected.  At any rate, domestic politics 
certainly play a role in the making of trade policy.  As noted above, popular opinion can 
be against RTAs because they generally entail job losses, which are unsurprisingly not 
popular among workers in affected industries.  The American public’s response to 
NAFTA was cool at best.  With the vote looming, Vice President Al Gore debated former 
Presidential candidate H. Ross Perot on television in an attempt by the Clinton 
administration to garner support for the agreement.  By most accounts, Gore soundly 
defeated Perot in the debate.  However, even after the debate a plurality of Americans 
(44%) were opposed to NAFTA.1  Despite their cost in jobs, RTAs can be good for the 
economy and a strong economy is popular among voters across the board.  Furthermore, 
while certain industries will be hurt by trade liberalization, others will greatly benefit 
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(such as the newspaper industry and the Canadian computer industry in the examples in 
Chapter 2).
Helen V. Milner discusses how the political ambiguity of regional trade 
agreements can characterize their provisions.  She identifies some characteristics of a 
state in which vote-seeking politicians would prefer to join a regional trade agreement.  
She assumes that industries that exhibit IRS are the most likely to support trade 
liberalization.  She further assumes that high profits for domestic firms lead to more votes 
for politicians, both because they are generally beneficial to the economy and because the 
firms themselves can help the politician get reelected by making monetary contributions 
to his or her campaign.  She finally assumes that politicians prefer more tariff revenue to 
less tariff revenue, since government money can be used in ways that will help the 
politician get more votes.2
Under these assumptions, Milner lays out four conditions under which politicians 
will strongly prefer membership in an RTA.3  First, existing tariff rates should be low.  
Intuitively, less tariff revenue will be lost in a low-tariff state that chooses to remove its 
tariffs than a high-tariff state.  Second, there should be many firms in the economy that 
have increasing returns to scale.  Again, the connection here is rather simple, as it means 
trade liberalization will be more likely to have an overall positive effect on the state’s 
economy.  Third, if negotiators have the ability to treat different sectors of the economy 
differently under the RTA they will be more likely to support it.  In this way, they can 
open up the economy for firms in IRS industries and protect firms in non-IRS industries.  
1
 Leon Hadar, “Making Progress on NAFTA,” Business Times, 12 November 1993, p. 30.
2
 Helen Milner, “Industries, Governments, and Regional Trade Blocs,” in The Political Economy of 
Regionalism, ed. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997), 87-88.
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Finally, RTAs are best for states with smaller domestic economies relative to the size of 
the market created by the RTA, since they will have the most to gain economically from 
liberalization.
The advantages suggested in these conditions, though logical, do not seem to be 
truly “non-economic.”  It is important to note that there is no way a clear line of 
distinction can be drawn between economic and non-economic motivations.  The 
importance of Milner’s arguments is that they consider the relative economic gains from 
joining an RTA, rather than the absolute gains that an economist may point to.  
Comparative advantage shows that all states will gain from free trade, but does not 
suggest how much the states will gain or whether or not they will gain equally.  There are 
political costs as well as political benefits to free trade, and these must be weighed 
against each other by democratically elected policy- makers seeking reelection.  Milner 
thus provides some guidelines as to the characteristics of states for which this cost-benefit 
analysis would likely prove favorable for trade liberalization.
There are other benefits of RTAs that have less to do with economics and more to 
do with international politics.  Arvind Panagariya lists three benefits of joining an RTA 
for a developing state that arose during the NAFTA negotiations.4  First, these states can 
ensure that they maintain their access to the markets of the developed members.  Without 
RTAs, developing states could lose this access should politicians in developed states turn 
protectionist.  Similarly, the developing state can avoid being subjected to non-tariff 
barriers.  Finally, RTAs can be an effective way to “lock in” market reforms in the 
developing state, to prevent future protectionist governments from overturning them.
3
 Ibid., 90.
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This is particularly effective if the RTA has a dispute settlement body, since this 
can then mandate the repeal of policies in violation of the agreement.  RTAs can also 
provide a convenient way for politicians to enact unpopular economic reforms.  If joining 
an RTA is popular in a developing state, and economic reforms are a precondition for 
membership, than the people will be more likely to be accepting of the otherwise 
unpalatable reforms.  The concept of locking in reform can be important not only for the 
developing state but also its regional trading partners, since it is in the interest of 
developed states to have economically sound neighbors.
4
 Arvind Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: Essays on Preferential Trading (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 1999), 18.
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Chapter 4: The European Community
The Treaty of Paris was signed on April 18, 1951, establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC).  France, West Germany (hereafter Germany), Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, known collectively as the Six, agreed to pool 
their production of coal and steel.  The Six deepened their level of economic integration 
in 1957 when they signed the Treaties of Rome, establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC).  The 
EEC was intended to be a common market among the member states.  On July 1, 1967 
the institutions of all three European Communities combined, forming the basis for what 
is today the European Union.  In 1973 the European Communities (EC) expanded for the 
first time, admitting the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.  The EC expanded 
further in 1981, admitting Greece, and in 1986, admitting Spain and Portugal.
It was also in 1986 that the Single European Act (SEA) was signed.  The SEA 
was the culmination of several unsuccessful attempts at various EC summits to 
institutionalize the reforms needed to have a true common European market.  Summit 
meetings, or meetings of the heads of governments of all member states, were important 
instruments in formulating EC policy.  Though they did not have formal legislative 
power, they could influence the Community’s agenda by setting broad policy goals.  The 
summits were generally held several times each year with the member state holding the 
EC’s rotating presidency often playing host.
An unsuccessful summit meeting in late 1983 in Athens was followed in March 
1984 with another debacle in Brussels, this time featuring Irish Prime Minster Garret 
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FitzGerald walking out on negotiations.  FitzGerald was dissatisfied with Ireland’s 
inability to get an exemption for a reduction in dairy production quotas.1  The British 
demand for a reduction in their payments into the EC budget was also a major point of 
contention at the Brussels summit.  French President François Mitterand, who held the 
rotating presidency at the time, noted that this issue was made particularly difficult 
because of the hard line taken by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.2
Mitterand did have a measure of success with his next summit meeting, this time 
in Fontainebleau in his native France.  The summit, held in June 1984, solved the 
problem of the British budget contribution by granting Prime Minister Thatcher $800 
million of the $1 billion in rebates she had demanded.  It further introduced some 
measures towards what was called a “citizen’s Europe,” but these proposals, including a 
common flag, sports teams and diplomas, were not nearly as noteworthy as the economic 
reforms that would later be incorporated into the SEA.3
Thatcher introduced some of the more significant reforms at the next summit in 
Dublin in December 1984, calling for a reduction in non-tariff barriers (NTBs).4  The 
main focus of the Dublin summit was the accession negotiations for the candidate states 
Spain and Portugal.  However, the report of the Dooge Committee on streamlining 
institutional decision-making would prove to be a precursor for some of the reforms later 
enacted in the SEA.5
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The two new members quickly became involved in the debate over the future of 
Europe at their first summit in Brussels in the spring of 1985.  Though they were not 
scheduled to officially become members of the European Community until January 1, 
1986, Spain and Portugal did take part in the summit as the negotiations involved their 
accession, and also because they would be affected by the decisions made there.  Spain 
was quick to take a side in the debate over the common market.  In early April, shortly 
after the summit, Manuel Marin, the Spanish Secretary of State for EEC relations, voiced 
the Spanish government’s support for majority decision-making in all issue areas.  Marin 
stressed he believed that the new enlarged community would not be able to function 
without majority voting.6
The Milan summit in June 1985 was where the plans for the common market 
really began to be set in motion.  The impetus for this was a White Paper released by the 
Commission shortly before the summit.  The White Paper, called “Completing the 
Internal Market,” called for the removal of all barriers to trade by 1992.7  Lord Cockfield, 
the European Commissioner for the internal market, was seen as a passionate federalist 
and is today often credited with being largely responsible for the passage of the SEA, 
along with Commission President Jacques Delors.8  Cockfield’s rhetoric was particularly 
forceful in the area of tax disparities.  Shortly after the release of the White Paper he 
remarked, “The only conclusion that can be drawn is that no means exists of removing 
the frontier controls, and thus the frontiers, if there are significant tax and corresponding 
6
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price differences between the member states.”9  The White Paper did not call for 
complete tax harmonization, but excise and value added tax (VAT) rates were subject to 
change to prevent the kind of price distortion Cockfield referred to.
Although many European leaders had been calling for internal market reforms, 
the White Paper proposed initiatives that were more radical than what the states would 
likely have suggested on their own.  The proposals limiting national freedom in levying 
taxes were particularly unpopular with the Irish, Danes, and British.  This presented a 
problem for Margaret Thatcher, who had demanded a common market and so was faced 
with the unpleasant choice of pooling state sovereignty more than she desired or 
appearing to be hypocritical.10
At the Milan summit, the EC members no longer had to be concerned with 
Spanish and Portuguese accession or the British budget complaints, the two issues that 
had been dominating EC summits for several years.  With these issues out of the way, 
and with the release of Lord Cockfield’s White Paper, attention was turned to the 
common market.  At the summit, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with the 
support of President Delors and the Commission, proposed a system of qualified majority 
voting for issues including tax reform and the removal of NTBs.11  However, this 
proposal was rejected by Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister.  The 
negotiators did support in principle a proposal to establish a true common market by 
1992, but were unable to agree on implementation.  They decided instead to call a special 
meeting on institutional reform later in the year.  The original Six plus Ireland supported 
9
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this meeting.  The United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece were opposed to the meeting 
but announced they would attend anyway.12
The lead-up to the conference, which was to be held in Luxembourg in December 
1985, was characterized by posturing between those members strongly in favor of reform 
and those who were more skeptical.  In early July, the Danish threatened to boycott the 
conference.13  Soon after, the Italians challenged the British by stating that it would be 
impossible to have the common market that Prime Minister Thatcher claimed she wanted 
without significant institutional reform and pooling of sovereignty.14  However, these 
tensions cooled as the summer wore on, and by September it seemed that the Euroskeptic 
states were willing to negotiate.15  In October, a few months before the summit was to 
begin in Luxembourg, the British seemed to be backing off their previously skeptical 
stance.  Signifying that the British were not opposed in principle to instituting the 
common market reforms, British foreign minister Sir Geoffrey Howe stated that “the 
Treaty of Rome is not immutable” and added “Britain is not afraid of ‘European 
Union.’”16
It was at the Luxembourg summit that what would become the Single European 
Act was negotiated.  The members agreed that the only way to work towards the goal of a 
true internal market was by instituting majority voting across a wide variety of issue 
areas.  The European Parliament, the directly elected European body that sits in 
12
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Strasbourg, was also given a bit more influence over decision-making.  Some members, 
notably the Italians, believed that the new powers granted to the Parliament were not 
sufficient and this became a key point in the negotiations.17
By late January 1986, all but three members of the now officially twelve-member 
European Community had agreed in principle to the reforms formulated at the 
Luxembourg summit.  The United Kingdom and Denmark reserved judgment because of 
doubts about the degree to which they would have to pool sovereignty in various areas.  
More surprisingly, the Italians held out because they believed the agreed proposals were 
too modest.18
On February 17, 1986 the nine of the twelve members of the European 
Community signed the Single European Act.  Denmark, Greece, and Italy chose not to 
partake in the signing.  The Danish government pledged not to sign until they had the 
results of a referendum that was to be held in late February.  Greece and Italy chose not 
to sign until all other member states were ready to do so.  The signing was thus largely 
symbolic, since the Act could not go into effect until all members agreed to it.19
However, the Danish referendum returned a “yes” vote for the Act on February 28, 1986, 
clearing the way for the three holdouts to sign. Ratification by the members was thus the 
only remaining hurdle to the implementation of the SEA.
Ratification proved to be more than a mere technicality as debates in several 
member states delayed and threatened to derail the implementation process, which was 
originally slated to be completed on January 1, 1987.  In France, Prime Minister Jacques 
17
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Chirac of the right-wing Gaullist party needed to look to the opposition Socialists for 
support, since many in his own party were concerned that majority voting would violate 
French national sovereignty.20  In Greece, procedural issues in the parliament delayed 
ratification.  However, there was never really a question as to whether or not the Greeks 
would ratify the Act.21
The same could not be said in Ireland however, where a constitutional challenge 
forced the Act to be put to a referendum.  Some in Ireland, traditionally and 
constitutionally neutral since its independence from the United Kingdom, feared that the 
establishment of majority voting would lead to Ireland’s entanglement in military 
alliances.  In April 1987, the Irish Supreme Court ruled that ratification of the SEA would 
be unconstitutional.  However, all the major parties in the Irish parliament were in 
support of the Act, and so attempted to find away around the Court’s decision.  They 
ultimately decided on a constitutional amendment to ratify the Act, which by Irish law 
had to be put to a referendum.22  With all the major parties, led by Prime Minister Charles 
Haughey, campaigning for a yes vote, the Irish voted in favor of the Single European Act 
by a comfortable margin, although voter turnout was less than half.23  In June 1987, 
Ireland submitted its Instruments of Ratification, removing the last barrier to the SEA’s 
passage and allowing the Act to finally take effect on July 1, 1987.
In a sense the Single European Act was a turning point for European integration, 
since the years leading up to it’s signing were a period of stagnation during which trade 
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liberalization had stalled.24  The SEA called for the creation of a common market by 
1992.  Though the European Economic Community was already a customs union, there 
were significant NTBs to trade and cross-border investment.  Lord Cockfield’s White 
Paper called for some 300 measures to remove these NTBs, and these proposals were the 
technical backbone of the SEA.
In addition to the proposals aimed at establishing a common market, the SEA 
made three major institutional changes.  First, it introduced qualified majority voting 
(QMV) into several new decision areas.  QMV is a method of weighting votes by which 
each state is assigned a number of votes based on their populations, but disproportionally 
scaled to prevent the most populous countries from dominating the decision-making 
process.  For example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy were allotted 10 
votes while Luxembourg was allotted 2.  However, in 1985 Luxembourg had only about 
350,000 inhabitants whereas Germany had some 77 million.  Therefore, although states 
have varied representation based on their populations, it is not comparable to the US 
House of Representatives in which there is a fixed ratio of representatives to constituents. 
In a sense, it is analogous to a combination of the House and the Senate, where states are 
given equal representation.
The second major reform, known as “mutual recognition” facilitated the removal 
of NTBs by instituting relatively lax standards for various products and forcing member 
states to freely import goods from all other member states in compliance with these 
standards.  This prevented states from instituting regulations that would effectively ban 
products from other EC members in the way Germany had attempted to do in the Cassis 
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de Dijon case.  This is a common type of NTB, and is somewhat legitimized by the fact 
that such standards can be important for public health.  For example, British beef imports 
were banned throughout the globe in the wake of the mad cow scare.  However, some 
standards are largely arbitrary or are designed to protect local industries.  Mutual 
recognition solved this problem by legislating those standards that were acceptable and 
those that were not.
The third and final change was to grant more power to the European Parliament.  
The European Parliament is significant in that it is the only European institution whose 
members are elected directly by the people of Europe.  However, at the time of the 
passage of the SEA it had little power.  Decision-making power was instead held by two 
bodies.  Proposals originated in the European Commission, a body in which each state 
was represented by one or two Commissioners. The Council of Ministers, which was 
made up of the members of the cabinets of each member state, voted bills into law.  
Though the SEA certainly did not make the Parliament a major player on the European 
stage, it did give it the new power to propose amendments.  Even today, the European 
Parliament is struggling for power among the institutions of the European Union, and its 
future remains very much in question with the imminent eastward expansion of the 
European Union as well as the ongoing drafting of the EU Constitution.
The Single European Act is sometimes referred to as the “relaunching” of Europe, 
as it reversed the trend of stagnation that had prevailed in the decades leading up to its 
passage.  There are two schools of thought as to the impetus for this sudden change.  One 
is that some particularly ambitious European officials, led by European Commission 
President Jacques Delors and Commissioner Cockfield, masterminded and largely 
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implemented a scheme that the governments of Europe, if left to their own devices, 
would never have gone through with otherwise.  This theory, which Andrew Moravcsik 
refers to as “supranational entrepreneurship,” stresses the segregation between the 
institutions of the European Community and the governments of the member states.  
Moravcsik himself disagrees with the theory of supranational entrepreneurship, 
submitting that it was instead in the economic interests of the most powerful states to 
further liberalize trade at that time.25  However, Moravcsik looks only at the motivations 
of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.  While these states, as the largest and 
most powerful in the European Community, may have been the most important in getting 
the SEA passed, this chapter will examine the preference and motivation of all member 
states, divided into two groups.  The first group will consist of Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg (known collectively as the Benelux states), as well as Italy and the two 
newest members Spain and Portugal.  The members of this group were committed to 
establishing a federal system in Europe with increasing integration in many areas.  The 
second group consists of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark, and 
Ireland.  For one reason or another, these states were skeptical about increasing the level 
of integration of the Community.
Qualified majority voting was the most controversial proposal, because it broadly 
represented the pooling of national sovereignty.  While heads of government were 
unlikely to engage in a prolonged impassioned debate over a particular one of Lord 
Cockfield’s 300 technical reforms, the costs to the states of surrendering the national veto 
were obvious.  Furthermore, QMV encompassed any concerns a state may have about 
specific technical issues.  As long as a state had the power to veto it could prevent any 
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reform it was opposed to, no matter how insignificant it seemed.  Thus the debate over 
SEA was essentially a debate over the costs and benefits for the member states of 
majority voting rather than unanimity.
The issue of qualified majority voting is a complicated one, since the policy was 
technically in effect in many issue areas before the implementation of the SEA.26
However, two problems existed that necessitated a QMV provision in the SEA.  First, 
unanimity was required in several areas that were crucial to the formation of the common 
market, including tax policy and removing certain NTBs.27 Secondly, even in the issue 
areas in which QMV was law, it was not the common practice.  An implicit agreement 
existed between the member states by which if one state opposed a proposal as being 
against their “vital national interest,” the other states would not vote in support of the 
plan.  This agreement, known as the Luxembourg compromise, frustrated attempts to 
lower barriers to trade.28
Germany demonstrated their de facto veto power by announcing their opposition 
to a 1.8 per cent cut in grain prices in June 1985.  The German Agriculture Minister Ignaz 
Kiechle deemed the cut to be in conflict with Germany’s “vital interest” and the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, France, Denmark and Greece responded by pledging not to take part in 
the vote.  Frans Andriessen, the European Commissioner in charge of agriculture, told the 
press that the German decision and subsequent reaction from the member states was 
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Community that recognized the members’ right to a veto.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, each state could apparently decide for itself whether or not its national 
interests were endangered to a sufficient degree to exercise its veto.29
The German veto was significant for two reasons.  First, it came shortly before the 
Milan summit and it appeared to be a reversal of Germany’s previous position in favor of 
QMV.30  The Germans, like the British, had paid lip service to the idea of QMV, but were 
apparently unprepared to accept all of the consequences of instituting the practice.  This 
lent an air of hypocrisy to the statements of the German negotiators at Milan, since any 
words in support of QMV would be tainted by their recent action.  Although the five 
members who supported the German veto had long been in support of the Luxembourg 
compromise, Germany had been in favor of QMV.  This apparent reversal by one of the 
largest states in the Community thus appeared to be a deathblow for majority voting.31
The second reason is that the veto divided the EC along federalist and Euroskeptic lines.  
The members that supported the German veto by withdrawing their support for the grain 
price cut proposal were all states that, for one reason or another, did not want to see 
QMV put into practice.
Although these states were unified in their skepticism about surrendering their 
veto and pooling their sovereignty, they had disparate reasons for their positions.  In the 
instance noted above, Germany was concerned about the well being of its farmers, and 
German politicians were likely concerned about the domestic political repercussions of 
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difficulty with its application in certain issue areas.  This characterized the position of the 
larger EC members.  France was worried about the effects of majority voting on 
deregulating air transportation, while the United Kingdom was concerned that they may 
be unable to block legislation that would be detrimental to small businesses.32  However, 
neither of these states had broad ideological opposition to QMV and their concerns were 
ultimately allayed to the point that they supported the plan.
Greece and Denmark, on the other hand, objected to any plan that would expand 
the Community’s sphere of influence.33  This more ideological objection is evident in the 
fact that the Danish held out until the last minute, with the tacit support of the Greeks, 
and actually signed the SEA later than most other member states in February 1986.  
However, even Denmark approved the Act in the end, albeit after a national referendum.
Ireland, the state that posed the greatest threat of blocking the SEA due to a 
Constitutional challenge and a referendum, is a special case in that its opposition to QMV 
is almost entirely in one issue area.  Unlike the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece, 
Ireland supported the Luxembourg summit held in December 1985, and by extension the 
principle of QMV.  Although the reforms contained in the SEA are mostly economic in 
nature, certain clauses refer to security cooperation.  Ireland, which was militarily neutral 
by both tradition and Constitutional law, was at the time the only member of the 
Community not also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Raymond Crotty, an Irish citizen who opposed Ireland’s ratification of the Act, sought 
and was granted an injunction in an Irish court on the grounds that the SEA was 
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unconstitutional in January of 1987.  Ireland thus became the only member to fail to meet 
the January 1 deadline for ratification.
Although Ireland did eventually settle its constitutional crisis, the Irish struggle 
with ratification is demonstrative of the wide variety of factors that can influence a state’s 
decision to participate in a common market.  As more states become involved and 
integration deepens in more issue areas, there is an increasing likelihood that at least one 
member will have difficulty with some aspect of the community.  Ireland’s problems with 
the SEA were entirely extraneous from economic policy or barriers to trade, which was 
the crux of the Act in the first place.
Several members, notably the Benelux states and Italy, were staunch advocates of 
further integration.  Italy was so intent on opening up the internal market that it 
threatened to veto the SEA for not going far enough in its reform measures.  It was these 
four states that called for the Luxembourg conference to be called after the summit at 
Milan in 1985.  They further supported significant integration to the point of calling for a 
“European Union.”34  Although Spain and Portugal did not even officially become 
members until January 1, 1986, they quickly joined the pro-integration faction in calling 
for more reforms.  They called for a federal United States of Europe, and also strongly 
supported more power for the European Parliament.35
The Parliament is likely championed by the federalist states because the 
governments of the members cannot interfere it with.  In a sense, a powerful European 
Parliament would be a more effective form of QMV, since the states would have no 
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also bears the advantage of having the moral high ground, since any state opposing 
ceding power to the Parliament can be labeled anti-democratic.  In practice, the 
Parliament was likely not as significant an issue as QMV because even the states in 
support of Parliament as the major decision-making body knew that was many years 
away, and could thus be pushed to the back burner.
There are clear economic benefits to a common market, both from 
comparative advantage and from economies of scale.  The rhetoric of the states that 
opposed the SEA suggests that they supported the common market in theory, but often 
had complaints in one or more specific sector or issue area.  Thus the states that 
supported the common market may simply be those that did not have any specific foreign 
policy or domestic political reason to oppose it.  However, the federalist states may have 
also felt their interests could best be represented through a more supranational system.
For the smaller Benelux states, it makes mathematical sense to support QMV, 
since they are disproportionately represented.  The Luxembourg compromise is also a 
system of disproportionate representation, since it gives preference to any state that 
opposes a proposal, even if the state is small and all other states are in support of the 
proposal.  However, the small states can gain significant influence in supporting common 
market proposals through the use of qualified majority voting.
For the most part, Milner’s analysis holds true in the case of the EC.  The states 
that supported the SEA are largely those that best fit her criteria.  Her first criteria, that 
states will be more likely to support RTA membership if their tariff rates are already low.  
This could describe Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.  The three had agreed 
on a Benelux Economic Union in 1944 and had fully established the Union by 1958, 
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instituting the free flow of labor between the states.  Milner’s point is that states with low 
tariff rates have to expend less political capital to reduce them to zero (or another target 
rate) than those with high tariff rates.  In the case of the Benelux countries, it was not that 
their tariff rates were lower, but that there were less states to which they had to lower 
barriers to trade and labor flows.  In principle, Milner’s point should hold here although it 
cannot be applied strictly as she states it.
Milner also more or less correctly predicts the size breakdown of the states that 
supported the SEA and those that opposed it.  The large economies of Germany, France, 
and the United Kingdom were skeptical about the SEA, while the relatively smaller 
Benelux states were far more enthusiastic.  Ireland is a notable exception, but as 
explained above Ireland’s reluctance to ratify the SEA was based purely on its unique 
circumstances with respect to neutrality.  This demonstrates how Milner’s conditions, 
while generally applicable, can be complicated by extraneous factors.  RTAs with many 
members will thus on balance be more difficult to achieve, since each potential member 
brings unique problems that can frustrate the negotiation efforts.
Milner argues that states will support RTAs in which they can give special 
treatment to specific industries.  Here again, this principle can be applied to the SEA in a 
somewhat different way than Milner suggests it.  She argues that by giving some 
industries special treatment, states can maximize their economic advantage by 
liberalizing industries that show increasing returns to scale and protecting those that do 
not.  However, in the case of the EEC protection came in the form of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The CAP subsidized food production, allowing European 
farmers to sell their products at levels below the market price.  This gave the farmers a 
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distinct advantage and is thus a form of protectionism.  States therefore did not have to 
worry about protecting their agricultural industries in the SEA negotiations, since they 
were already highly protected.  The CAP may have even spurred protectionist states to 
ratify the SEA.  If a member state believed they would ultimately face a choice of SEA 
ratification or withdrawal from the EC, CAP payments would weigh heavily in favor of 
SEA ratification and continued membership.
The EC is undoubtedly a special case among RTAs, and Milner’s arguments need 
to be adapted to fit it.  However, the reasoning she uses seems to be borne out by the 
actions of the parties at the SEA negotiations.  Her arguments that RTA membership will 
be favored by small states, those with low pre-existing tariff levels, and those that can 
give special treatment to industries they hope to protect are demonstrated by this case 
study.
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Chapter 5: The North American Free Trade Agreement
The United States and Canada have all the elements of natural trading partners.  
They are both wealthy states with similar cultures and a common language and they share 
a long and relatively porous border.  By the 1980’s Canada and the United States both 
traded more with each other than with any other state.  In 1986, the two governments 
sought to formalize this relationship by entering into negotiations on a free trade 
agreement.  The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) was signed by 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on January 
2, 1988 and came into effect on January 1, 1989.
The major provisions of CUSTA were a gradual phase-out of quotas and tariffs 
between the two states, and a removal of restrictions on cross-border investment.  It also 
established a dispute settlement body for cases of accusations of dumping, or selling 
goods in foreign markets below their cost of production.  Although tariff rates between 
the two trading parties were already quite low in most sectors, CUSTA significantly 
increased the amount of cross-border investment.  Specifically, American foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into Canada grew substantially, although Canadian FDI flows into the 
United States remained at about pre-CUSTA levels.  However, this may not signal a 
failure of the agreement, but rather cheaper labor costs in Canada.  Richard G. Lipsey of 
the Canadian Institute for advanced research suggests that American firms could now 
shift production to Canada and still have access to the American market, whereas 
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Canadian firms no longer felt the need to establish plants in the United States in order to 
sell there.1
As is often the case, some trade in certain politically sensitive sectors was not 
completely liberalized.  One notable provision of CUSTA was that the Canadian 
“cultural” industries were given a degree of protection.  These industries, such as 
magazines and broadcasting, are important in Canada because of the belief that if the 
United States is allowed to export its culture to Canada as freely as it does around the 
world, Canada will lose its national identity.  While most issues of protection are 
important to only a small but often vocal minority, cultural protection arouses strong 
sentiment on a national level in Canada.2  The cultural industries were exempted from 
CUSTA, although the exemption allowed the United States to reciprocate and protect its 
own cultural industries.3  This supports Milner’s theory that states will be more likely to 
prefer RTAs if special treatment can be given to particular industries.
CUSTA is crucial to any discussion of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) because NAFTA is at its root an extension of CUSTA to Mexico.  
Furthermore, the factors that led to the passage of CUSTA, coupled with the relatively 
liberal Salinas administration in Mexico, produced a unique environment that allowed 
what would otherwise be a politically infeasible treaty to be negotiated.  In the United 
States, President Bush had fast track trade negotiating authority.  This meant that he 
could negotiate trade agreements with the assurance from Congress that they would be 
1
 Richard G. Lipsey, “Economic Consequences of Free Trade: A Canadian Viewpoint,” in Building a 
Partnership: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, ed. Mordechai Kreinin (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2000), 60.
2
 William A. Dymond, “Cultural Issues,” in Kreinin, 114.
3
 René Lemieux and Joseph Jackson, “Cultural Exemptions in Canada’s Major International Trade 
Agreements and Investment Relationships,” http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb9925-
e.htm, (6 April 2004).
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voted on within certain amount of time.  Congress was also prohibited from amending 
any agreement the President negotiated.
Bush was advocating a policy of bilateral trade agreements that had been 
established by Ronald Reagan’s and later his own Secretary of State, James Baker.4
Baker’s philosophy was that multilateral agreements like the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were flawed.  He believed that if a small minority of countries
did not wish to liberalize their trade policy they could hold up the entire process for those 
who did.  Bilateral negotiations allowed the United States to enter into negotiations with 
only those countries that were prepared to make progress toward free trade as the United 
States defined it.
In the early 1990’s Mexico was such a country.  For some sixty years Mexico had 
been in effect a one-party state, with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) being the 
sole wielder of power.  Carlos Salinas, though fraudulently elected in 1988, was seen by 
many as the man who could change the direction of Mexican economic policy, both at 
home and abroad.  After a crushing recession in 1981-1982, Mexican policymakers 
became aware of the need to modernize their economy.  Salinas was instrumental from 
the beginning of this process, as the Secretary of Planning and Budget under President 
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, elected in 1982.  In 1984, Mexico privatized 339 state-
owned companies, largely under Salinas’ direction.5  In 1985, Salinas was instrumental in 
4
 Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 6.
5
 David Gardner, “Mexico Puts Austerity Package Into Effect After Oil Price Drop,” Financial Times, 1 
March 1985, sec. I, p. 6.
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shifting from a permit system to a tariff system of imports, which facilitated the flow of 
goods into Mexico.6
Among the initiatives introduced under Hurtado and Salinas were measures to 
open Mexico’s economy to foreign trade and investment.  These policies got a further 
boost when Salinas took office as President in 1988.  However, Salinas was at first 
opposed to bilateral trade negotiations, preferring to work through the framework of the 
GATT.  In 1988, Salinas specifically stated his opposition to a bilateral trade agreement 
between the United States and Mexico, noting that he believed the gap between the two 
economies was likely to prevent either state from enjoying any significant economic 
benefits.7
Despite Salinas’ rhetoric, the groundwork had already been laid for bilateral 
negotiations between the two states.  The Framework Understanding on Trade and 
Investment, signed in 1987, identified potential issues for negotiation between the United 
States and Mexico.  However, the breakthrough for Mexico came at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 1990.  Mexico came to the Forum hoping to sell 
itself as a potential recipient of foreign investment.  However, the stars of the forum were 
the states of Eastern Europe, newly liberalized due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Salinas and his administration realized that Mexico would have to do something to draw 
the attention of the international business community.8  Salinas decided the best course of
action would be to establish a bilateral agreement with the United States, and contacted 
6
 David Gardner, “Mexico Devalues Peso By 16.7% in Major Austerity Package,” Financial Times, 26 July 
1985, sec. I, p. 16.
7
 Larry Rohter, “North American Trade Bloc? Mexico Rejects Such an Idea,” The New York Times, 24 
November 1988, sec. D, p. 1.
8
 Larry Rohter, “Stop the World, Mexico is Getting On,” The New York Times, 3 June 1990, sec. 3, p. 1.
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President Bush in February 1990 to propose negotiations.  Bush, acting on the Baker 
policy of favoring bilateral agreements, welcomed the proposal.
In March 1990, President Bush informed Prime Minister Mulroney of President 
Salinas’ request for opening trade negotiations.  Mulroney was at first hesitant to join the 
agreement.  CUSTA, which he had supported, was perceived to have been responsible for 
Canadian job losses in manufacturing.9  However, a task force was formed to explore the 
issue in more detail.  The task force recommended in August 1990 that Canada join the 
United States and Mexico in trilateral negotiations.  Among the reasons cited were fear 
that Mexico would negotiate for better access to the US market and a desire to prevent a 
hub-and-spoke model of investment diversion.  In this scenario, without a single set of 
investment rules for the three countries, Canadian corporations wishing to invest in 
Mexico could have been forced to channel their investment through the United States.
Trilateral negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
began on June 12, 1991.  The negotiations continued in fits and starts and were not yet 
near a conclusion in the summer of 1992 when the American Presidential race began to 
intensify.  NAFTA was a key issue in the campaign, with President Bush hoping to have 
the negotiations complete by the start of the Republican National Convention in August.  
Some questions arose as to the stance of the Democratic candidate for President, 
Governor Bill Clinton.
In the candidates’ debate held on October 19, 1992, President Bush attempted to 
paint Governor Clinton as indecisive on NAFTA.  The President stated, “My problem 
with Governor Clinton once again, is that one time he’s going to make up his mind he 
will see some merit in it, but then he sees a lot of things wrong with it.  And then the 
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other day he says he’s for it, however, we’ve got to pass other legislation.”10  However, 
Clinton presented a qualified and nuanced view of the agreement that seemed neither 
protectionist nor insensitive to the concerns of labor or environmentalists. Clinton stated, 
“I say on balance it does more harm than good if – if we can get some protection for the 
environment so the Mexicans have to follow their own environmental standards, their 
own labor law standards and if we have a genuine commitment to re-educate and retrain 
the American workers who lose their jobs and reinvest in this economy.”11  President 
Bush appeared wholly pro-NAFTA and independent candidate H. Ross Perot famously 
remarked that NAFTA would cause a “great sucking sound” of American jobs moving to 
Mexico.12  Clinton was thus able to put forth a balanced third way, and won the 
Presidency in November 1992.
Negotiations were completed by the end of 1992, and the Agreement was signed 
by a lame duck President Bush, with Clinton’s approval.  Significant problems arose in 
the spring of 1993, however, when it was revealed that a fund had been established by a 
Mexican bank to lure American corporations to Mexico.  This rekindled fears of massive 
American job losses, but the new Clinton administration nonetheless entered into 
negotiations on the proposed side agreements.  These negotiations continued throughout 
the summer of 1993, despite significant criticism from some members of Congress, and 
were completed on August 13.  Though the Agreement faced a tough ratification battle, 
9
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intense lobbying by President Clinton and a debate victory by Al Gore over Ross Perot 
on “Larry King Live” in November were sufficient to achieve ratification.13
The North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1994.  
Article 102 of the Agreement puts forth six main purposes: remove barriers to trade, 
promote fair competition, increase cross-border investment, protect intellectual property 
rights, provide a mechanism for dispute resolution, and establish a framework for further 
negotiations between the members.14
There is no doubt that NAFTA is an economic agreement.  The NAFTA members 
differ greatly from those of the European Union in that they have no aspirations towards 
political, or even monetary union.  The text of the NAFTA treaty is about nothing more 
than economic relations between geographic neighbors.  However, this does not mean 
that economics was the only motivating factor for the three states negotiating this 
agreement.  Each of the three member states had a different mixture of motives, all of 
which included some factors that went beyond the realm of economic policy.
The United States
NAFTA was being negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and 
the United States was beginning be labeled “the world’s only superpower.”  If the United 
States was a superpower on the world stage, it was a “hyperpower” in North America.  Of 
the three NAFTA members, there was no doubt that the United States had the most 
political and economic clout.  What, then, could the United States hope to gain from 
entering into an agreement that bound it to two states with significantly smaller 
economies?
13
 Cameron and Tomlin, 203-204.
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A trade economist would note that based on comparative advantage proves that 
the United States will stood to gain economically from trade liberalization, even if it was 
a more efficient producer across the board than its trading partners.  However, Milner’s 
analysis demonstrates that the greatest economic benefits are enjoyed by the states with 
the smallest economy.  Thus as the largest economy the United States stood to gain the 
least economically from the agreement.  Regardless, this was not the United States’ sole, 
or even its major purpose in accepting the Mexican invitation to negotiation.
While economic benefits from free trade are hard for the general population to 
identify, job losses are obvious to everyone.  NAFTA was being negotiated amidst fears 
from labor groups that many American jobs would be lost if tariffs on Mexican imports 
were reduced.  The phantom of Ross Perot’s “great sucking sound” galvanized public 
opinion against the Agreement and led to Perot having an impressive showing for a third-
party candidate in the 1992 Presidential Election.  The fact that Clinton was the less 
enthusiastic proponent of NAFTA of the two major candidates probably contributed to 
his victory.
With a small economic benefit that was not likely to be perceived by the public 
and a significant amount of anti-NAFTA rhetoric focusing on job losses, the Agreement 
would appear to be a politician’s worst nightmare.  However, both President Bush and 
Candidate and then President Clinton broadly supported the Agreement during its 
negotiation.  The reason for this is largely extraneous to American economics.  NAFTA 
was thought to be a mechanism for locking in the Mexican economic reforms engineered 
14
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by Salinas and encouraging future Mexican democratic reforms.  For the United States, 
then, NAFTA was not about economic benefits but rather regional stability.
Panagariya’s argument about locking in economic reforms describes how RTAs 
can benefit developing states.  However, this can be beneficial for their industrialized 
neighbors as well.  The United States certainly had an interest in keeping Mexico solvent, 
since it was the most likely candidate to provide a bailout in another Mexican debt crisis.
The United States saw NAFTA not only as a mechanism for locking in pre-
existing reforms but for encouraging the Mexican government to reform more.  By early 
1993, the Salinas administration was convinced NAFTA was the key to its economic 
success, and thus was willing to make concessions to the United States to ensure the 
agreement’s enactment.  Although maintaining it supported the agreement all along, the 
Clinton administration took advantage of this situation by conditioning signing on 
Mexican environmental reforms.15  This also likely made NAFTA more palatable to the 
American public.
Mexico
Of the three NAFTA members, Mexico’s motives were the most rooted in 
economics.  By gaining access to the lucrative American market, Mexico could promote 
itself as an attractive destination for foreign investment.  Foreign corporations could 
establish plants in Mexico and benefit from relatively cheap Mexican labor and still be 
able to sell their goods in the United States for a negligible cost.  This meant more jobs 
and a higher standard of living for the average Mexican.
15
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Again Milner’s principle of significant benefits for small economies comes into 
play here.  Not only was Mexico the smallest economy, it was the least opened to trade.  
Because of CUSTA, NAFTA was in a sense Mexico joining an agreement that the United 
States and Canada had already established.  Thus Mexican politicians’ preference for the 
agreement goes against Milner’s argument that states with the lowest pre-existing tariffs 
will most support RTAs.  However, Salinas had already established himself as an 
economic reformer.  He was thus atypical in the sense that he had proven willing to make 
changes that may be unpopular if he believed they would benefit the economy in the 
long-term.
The other major implication of Mexico’s higher pre-NAFTA tariff rates was that 
it stood to gain even more from an economic standpoint.  A state making a transition 
from highly protectionist to highly liberalized will enjoy more economic benefits than 
one that only slightly lowers its tariff rates.  As Milner indicates, this economic gain 
comes with a political cost.  However, Salinas had established that he valued long-term 
economic development relatively higher than Milner’s theoretical politician, even when it 
came in conflict with his political standing.
As Panagariya would suggest, Salinas may also have been motivated by a desire 
to lock in the reforms he had established in the Mexican economy.  As an economic 
reformer, Salinas had bucked the trend of his PRI predecessors, and it was thus 
reasonable for him to assume that some of his policies may be reversed by successive 
administrations.  By establishing free trade with the United States and Canada as a treaty 
obligation, Salinas made it very difficult for future Mexican Presidents to re-institute 
protectionist policies.  
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Canada
Prime Minister Mulroney’s initial response to the idea of trilateral negotiations 
was to reject them, so it is important to look at the factors that persuaded him to change 
his mind.  Broadly speaking, Canada opposed the idea of a free trade agreement between 
the United States and Mexico, but realized it was powerless to stop it.  With such an 
agreement inevitable, Canadian officials realized they were better off inside the 
agreement than outside it.  Canada hoped to have a voice in the negotiations and have 
some of its more important concerns met.
On an economic level, Canada was concerned about losing ground relative to 
Mexico in terms of access to the American market.  If fewer barriers to trade existed 
between the United States and Mexico than between the United States and Canada, 
corporations would have more incentive to locate in Mexico.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that Mexican labor was likely to be cheaper than Canadian labor.  
By joining the negotiations, Canada could ensure that any relative gain in Mexican access 
was extended to Canada as well.
The Canadian concern for having a voice in negotiations can be traced back to 
CUSTA.  Canadian protection of cultural industries is a sign of the Canadians’ deep 
concern with their national identity.  Lowering barriers to trade not only leads to an influx 
of goods, but often an influx of culture as well.  If the United States happens to be the 
most efficient producer of films, than American films will tend to be the most consumed 
in a world with no barriers to trade.  However, unlike bicycles or computers, American 
films can spread American values.
                                                                                   Smith 49
In reality this is not the case in most parts of the world due to significant language 
and cultural barriers, even in the absence of economic ones.  For example, Sudanese 
films would not likely be very popular in the United States even if they were significantly 
cheaper than American ones because they would be too difficult for an American 
audience to understand.  However, Canada is in a unique situation because it shares a 
common language with the United States and is culturally similar to begin with.  This 
initial homogeneity between the two states lead Canadians to believe that without 
economic protection for cultural industries, Canada could become culturally 
indistinguishable from the United States.
By entering into a free trade agreement with the United States, Canada could best 
protect its culture without losing the economic benefits of trading with the economic 
behemoth on its southern border.  Canada’s main motivation was thus to maintain its 
identity and exercise its ability to voice its opinion.  Canada had insisted from early on in 
the negotiation process that its cultural industries remain protected.16  The United States 
was powerful enough to be a global superpower with or without Canada, and the 
decisions made by the US government would undoubtedly affect its northern neighbor.  
Canada’s membership in NAFTA was thus a means for it to influence those decisions.
16
 Shawn McCarthy, “Culture Out of Trade Talks, Official Insists,” The Toronto Star, 5 March 1992, sec. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The two regional trade agreements discussed above provide somewhat different 
pictures of what makes states join regional trade agreements.  It is useful here to consider 
the commonalities and the differences between the two, and what can be learned from 
them about the future of RTAs.
Some general themes stand out as common to these RTAs, and are likely to hold 
in most regional trade scenarios.  First, states with small economies stand to benefit the 
most from trade liberalization, and are likely to be the most ardent supporters of regional 
trade agreements.  Mexico and the pro-federalist states in the European Community were 
by and large the states with smaller economies relative to the size of the economy to be 
formed by the new regional trade agreement or common market.  Second, small states 
also desire regional influence.  The small states of Europe who would be 
disproportionately represented by QMV were unsurprisingly its biggest proponents.  In 
the NAFTA case, Canada hoped to maintain its cultural identity and saw the agreement 
as a means to this end.
However, small states are not universally in support of RTAs.  The case of Ireland 
is instructive in many ways.  First, it demonstrates how issues entirely unrelated to 
economics can play a role in regional trade.  The Irish constitutional challenge was about 
security, an issue hardly mentioned in the SEA.  Secondly, Ireland shows how fragile the 
regionalization process is.  The actions of one individual in Ireland nearly prevented the 
formation of a common market between twelve states with a combined population of 
several hundred million.  As more states are involved in an RTA, more peculiarities are 
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brought into play.  Even small groups can have difficulty forming RTAs.  The NAFTA
negotiations were far from unproblematic, despite the fact that only three states were 
involved and two of them had already established a free trade area.  What, then, can these 
two cases teach us about the future prospects for regional trade agreements?
 Based on an examination of NAFTA and the Single European Act, it seems 
several conditions can be identified that facilitate RTAs being successfully implemented.  
First, fewer states are better.  Less states means less potential challenges to 
regionalization.  As the European Union now expands to twenty-five and soon perhaps 
twenty-seven members, integration will become significantly more difficult.  It certainly 
would be impossible to have such a large body operate under the Luxembourg 
compromise system.  Pooling of sovereignty through the surrendering of a national veto 
is a prerequisite to integration between many states, and there do not seem to be many 
regions in the world ready to take this step.
In the case where many states are involved, it is useful for several of them to have 
already formed an RTA of some kind amongst themselves.  The Benelux states are an 
excellent example of this.  Not only could they be considered as one state for the 
purposes of tariff reduction, they also had much to gain economically from the RTA, and 
thus were leading proponents in the debates.
Secondly, some large states should be involved.  When there is potential access to 
a large market, the smaller states will be more willing to make sacrifices to join the RTA.  
The Mexican decision-making process during the NAFTA negotiations was certainly 
influence by the fact that Mexico was on the verge of gaining access to the largest market 
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in the world.  It is unlikely Mexico would have made the same concessions to join a free 
trade area with only Canada as it did to join one with Canada and the United States.
Finally, the Mexican example is further illustrative of the motivations of larger 
states.  The United States had little to gain economically from NAFTA, and public 
opinion polls showed at best a mixed response to the agreement.  However, the Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy goal of locking in Mexican reforms was the crucial 
element that lead to the United States’ support of the agreement, and ultimately its 
enactment.  Moravcsik stresses how in Europe the SEA was ultimately in the economic 
interests of the larger states.
These conditions are hard to come by, and it is not surprising that so few regions 
of have integrated to the level of the European Union or even NAFTA.  While regional 
trade agreements will likely continue to be a popular instrument of the promotion of free 
trade in many parts of the globe, deeply integrated RTAs like those considered here are 
likely to remain rare.  An examination of states’ motives for joining regional trade 
agreements suggests that the European Union is likely to remain a unique association of 
states for many years to come.
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